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In this paper we develop a simple neoclassical growth model with perfect international 
capital mobility to analyze the international debt dynamics of developing countries in 
general and Brazil and Argentina in particular. We show that three different regimes can 
be distinguished: a stable steady state debtor regime, a stable steady state creditor regime 
and an unstable regime. A switch from a stable debtor or a stable creditor position to an 
unstable creditor regime may be a sign of forthcoming trouble. We investigate this issue 
empirically for Brazil and Argentina over the period 1960-1999. Over the full sample, the 
evidence suggests that debt dynamics evolved according to the stable debtor case in both 
countries. Using a rolling regression technique, we find that indeed occasional switches 
to the unstable regime occurred. In particular, Argentina was in the unstable regime for 
most of the 1990s way before the Argentine debt crisis erupted. 
                                                 
* We are grateful to Bertrand Candelon for useful help and comments. Responsibility for this paper is 
entirely ours. The paper was written when all authors were at Maastricht University.    2
1. Introduction 
 
After the hectic Latin-American debt crisis in the early 1980s, sovereign risk appeared to 
have disappeared from the scene. However, a series of international crises in the late 
1990s have brought the issue of sovereign risk back on the agenda. First, the Asia crisis 
in 1997 hit international financial markets, followed by the Russia crisis in 1998 and the 
Argentina meltdown in 2001-2002. Moreover, interest rates on Brazilian debt have been 
rising throughout the first half of 2002 for fears of the populist politician Lula being 
elected. If so, international investors expect more domestically oriented, protectionist 
policies and a possible default on Brazil’s international debt. Of course, the rising interest 
rates on the Brazilian debt considerably contribute to the probability of Brazil defaulting 
as the debt burden increases.  
Unsurprisingly, a large theoretical and empirical literature has emerged on the 
analysis of sovereign risk. On the theoretical side, a distinction has been made between 
ability-to-pay models and more modern willingness-to-pay models. The first category 
focuses on the development of solvency and liquidity ratios to determine the 
creditworthiness of individual countries. The more modern approach uses concepts from 
financial contracting theory and asymmetric information problems to investigate in which 
circumstances a country may choose not to honor its international debts, even if it could 
afford to do so in principle. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) provide an excellent overview of 
this type of literature. In general, both strands of literature yield a number of potential 
indicators of forthcoming debt crises. However, empirical studies generally show that 
forecasting sovereign defaults is far from easy. The performance record of both 
commercial rating agencies and academic research in this respect is poor, see for example 
Oetzel, Bettis and Zenner (2001). 
In this paper, we return to an older literature that focuses on simple debt 
dynamics. The model by Amano (1965) is the simplest variant of a model type, which 
explains the occurrence of debt crises in a neoclassical framework solely due to shocks. 
In addition, the model generates conditions under which the traditional idea of a debt 
cycle can be shown to hold or not to hold respectively.
1 Amano (1965) does not go into 
                                                 
1 For alternative and more complex models of debt cycles we refer to Fischer and Frenkel (1972), Frenkel 
and Fischer (1974a,b), Onitsuka (1974) and Hori and Stein (1977).   3
details of the debt cycle but rather emphasizes that a country’s GNP may grow at a rate 
larger than the natural one if it saves much and foreign investment (credit) income is a 
large share of GNP. We will use the model to show analytically (i) that the model can 
show debt crises only in the form of a shock, and (ii) that a dynamic debt process can be 
derived graphically with several possible outcomes.  
These outcomes can be dichotomized as follows. First, a debtor country can be on 
a stable path towards a steady state. In the final steady state, the country will remain a 
debtor if its saving ratio is low. However, it can also become a creditor in the steady state 
if its saving ratio is high enough. Second, the country can be on an unstable path without 
ending up in a steady state. In that case, the country can become a permanent creditor – 
again if its saving ratio is high enough. In a sense, we might call this the stable arm of the 
unstable path. Amano (1965) emphasizes the latter case, in which the country’s GNP is 
dominated by foreign income and grows at a rate higher than the natural rate. 
Alternatively, the country can be situated on the unstable arm of the unstable path and 
experience an exploding debt, inevitably leading to a crisis. We derive each of these cases 
from a linear differential equation in debt per unit of GNP.  
Subsequently, we estimate these equations for Argentina and Brazil respectively 
both for the whole period 1960-1999 and for shorter periods. Our purpose is to show that 
a country’s debt dynamics can switch between the stable and unstable paths over time in 
response to unexpected shocks. Evidence that the country is situated on the unstable path 
at some point in time potentially contributes to the analysis of its creditworthiness and to 
the prediction of the possibility of a forthcoming debt crisis. We find evidence of 
unstable Argentine debt dynamics as early as the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the model, which we 
use to derive the various debt dynamic processes in section 3. In section 4 we present 
data and estimation procedure for Brazil and Argentina. We present and discuss the 
results in section 5. The summary and conclusions follow in section 6.  
 
   4
2. A simple neoclassical growth model with perfect capital mobility 
 
We start from a simple neoclassical growth model with a fixed rate of interest. Due to the 
assumption of perfect international capital mobility, the domestic interest rate is given 
and fixed at the level of the world interest rate. In addition, we assume that output (Y) is 
produced by the production factors capital (K) and labor (L) with labor-augmenting 
technology (A). The production function is linearly homogeneous with positive first and 
negative second partial derivatives: 
 
Y   =   F ( K , A L )          ( 1 )  
 
Profit maximization of the representative firm yields the marginal productivity condition  
 
r = f’(k)    with   k ≡  K/AL   and     ∃ ∃ ∃ KA Lg =+≡     (2) 
 
Since r is given, the marginal productivity condition determines the capital/efficient-labor 
ratio. The capital stock K consists of domestic capital W and foreign capital or debt D. 
Conditional on the level of the domestic stock of capital W, the country can choose its 
desired level of foreign indebtedness D to make equation (2) hold at any moment. The 
labor force L grows at rate n. In the steady state the capital stock K and output Y grow at 
the same constant rate g, keeping k constant.  
We assume goods market equilibrium to hold. In a small open economy under 
perfect capital mobility, the country then can finance any domestic investment in excess 
of national savings through the international capital market. Excess investment results in 
an equal increase in the country’s international indebtedness, as reflected in equation (3): 
 
&& D K S =− ,          ( 3 )  
 
where dots indicate the change in a variable per unit of time. Domestic savings is 
assumed to depend on the country’s income net of foreign interest payments, with 
marginal propensity to save equal to s:  
 
S = s ( Y - r D ) ,          ( 4 )  
   5
Combining equations (2)-(4) yields a differential equation for the change in the 
country’s external debt per period. Note that these debt dynamics are derived from the 
goods market equilibrium condition and therefore reflect only the ‘fundamentals’: 
investment and savings.  
 
& () [() ] Dg Ke s Ye r D
gt gt =−− 00      ( 3 ’ )  
 
For a formal treatment of this differential equation we refer to appendix A. In the next 
section we provide a more intuitive explanation.  
 
 
3. Debt cycle versus permanent debtor position 
 
First, we slightly rewrite equation (3’). From the marginal productivity condition (2), we 
see that r = β Y/K where β  is the initial capital share.
2 Substitution leads to:  
 
& () [ / ] DK gs r e s r D
gt =− + 0 β        ( 3 ’ ’ )  
 
Subsequently we express D in terms of GDP (Y). To this purpose, we first divide both 
sides of equation (3’’) by D, subtract g – the steady-state growth rate of Y – and then 
multiply by D/Y.
3 The result is 
 
& [/ ] [] dk gs r gs r d =− − − β        ( 5 )  
 
where d denotes the ratio of debt over GDP (D/Y). In equation (5), k is the capital-output 
ratio from equation (2). The sign and size of the slope and the intercept depend on the 
(unobserved) parameters g, s, β , and r and can be positive or negative. The three possible 
cases – corresponding to the different stable and unstable paths of the differential 
equations – are shown in figure 1. In this figure d is on the horizontal axis, while d &  is on 
the vertical one. 
                                                 
2 This expression is only used to eliminate Y(0) in the differential equation.  
3 Alternatively, we may express D as a percentage of the stock of efficient labor (AL). Equation (5) is 
unaltered by this transformation, apart from the definition of d, which now is D/AL. Unreported results 
show that our empirical results are qualitatively the same for both definitions of d. We prefer to use GDP as 
the denominator as both GDP and D are generally available in US$, whereas AL is only available in real 
terms. Hyperinflationary periods make conversion much more problematic when AL is used to normalize.   6
If sr/β > g > sr, both the slope and the intercept are negative. The corresponding 
line in figure 1 is indicated by SC. The stable stationary point (I) is at negative values of 
d, implying that the country becomes a creditor in the long run. In point I, the ratio of 
foreign wealth (D) to GDP remains constant if there are no more shocks. Both D and Y 
grow at the same rate g. Since D is negative, it implies the country holds positive net 
foreign assets in the steady state. Suppose the country starts out as a debtor at positive 
values of d. Subsequently, d will decrease to converge to the steady state along line SC. It 
can be easily shown that initially the level of external debt D will still grow – though at a 
slower pace than GDP – corresponding to a current account deficit. Over time, the current 
account deficit is reduced and turns into a surplus with reduction in D. This case is the 
traditional view on the debt cycle in which every country eventually becomes a creditor 
(non-debtor). 
If g>sr/β , and g>sr, the slope remains negative, but the intercept becomes 
positive. This case is captured by line SD in figure 1. Now, the country converges to a 
steady state (II) where d is positive. The economy remains a debtor because of its low 
savings ratio and/or the low world interest rate. The low savings rate forces the country to 
externally finance its domestic investment, while the low world interest rate helps to 
reduce the cost of doing so. In the steady state, D again grows at the rate g, which implies 
that the country remains a capital importer. The current account is not balanced in the 
long run unless the horizontal intercept of the differential equation is at the origin.
4  
If g-sr<0, the slope is positive and the vertical intercept is negative. This is the 
unstable case, labeled U in figure 1. By implication, g –sr >0 is a stability condition, but 
obviously, there is no reason to a priori impose such stability assumption. The stationary 
but unstable point (III) is at a positive value of d. If d(0) is less than in the stationary 
point, the economy starts moving to the region of negative and continuously declining d. 
In that case, the country will be a creditor in the long run, where GNP grows faster than 
GDP (see appendix A). This was the point Amano (1965) tried to make. 
                                                 
4 In the literature it is often assumed that the current account must be balanced in the long run, based on the 
assumption that creditors will try to increase their welfare by not allowing other countries to borrow 
permanently (see Cohen 1991). Whether this is the case, however, is an empirical as well as a theoretical 
question. In our model we do not explicitly impose the restriction of a balanced CA.   7
A starting point to the right of the stationary point implies that D(0) sufficiently 
exceeds K(0), as shown in appendix A. The country then starts out with more debt than 
capital and will have negative current wealth for all periods. Clearly this is unsustainable 
in the longer run. A country on such explosive path will be forced to adjust, one way or 
the other.
5 As D(0) > K(0) seems to be an unrealistic case from an empirical point of 
view, we will interpret explosive debt dynamics as a case of sovereign risk when it 
appears in our estimates.  
In this type of model, a switch from one dynamic process – say the SD line – to 
another – say the SC line – can only arise due to changes in the underlying parameters of 
the system, g, s, β , and r.
6 As an example, we will discuss a permanent upward jump in 
the world interest rate. If this happens, the marginal product of capital will increase and 
the optimal amount of capital K to be used will fall. For a given national wealth W, a fall 
in the desired level of capital K implies that less external debt D is required. As a result 
less debt is obtained from the international capital market. Alternatively stated, it implies 
that more domestic wealth is invested abroad at the higher world interest rate level. Such 
a decrease in capital inflows or increase in capital outflow – even capital flight – thus can 
be rooted in the economy’s fundamentals and need not be a purely monetary 
phenomenon of irrational speculators. Domestically, the resulting lower marginal product 
of labor leads to a fall in real wages. This is the social side of the crisis.  
We can also describe these dynamics in terms of differential equation (5) and 
Figure 1. Starting from a situation where the country is a long-run debtor (the SD line), a 
jump in the interest rate leads to both a counter-clock wise rotation (flatter slope) and a 
downward shift of the SD line. The economy can move from the situation g > sr/β  > sr 
(SD in figure 1) to a situation sr/β  > g > sr (SC) or even to a situation sr/β  > sr > g (U), 
depending on the size of the interest rate shock.  
                                                 
5 Neher (1970) assumes that debt d grows at the same rate as the capital stock. As we have shown, this is 
only the case in the steady states of the stable cases. Amano (1965) has treated only the left arm of the 
unstable case. Our model integrates all these cases and can be seen as a simplified version of the model by 
Onitsuka (1974). 
6 Of course, there can also be exogenous shocks to d without changing the prevailing differential equation. 
This moves the economy along the relevant line in figure 1 rather than changing the position of the line 
itself.   8
A similar analysis can be given for other exogenous events changing the slope 
and intercept of the differential equation, like for instance a jump in the savings rate s or 
in the rate of population growth n or technical change which in turn changes g.  
In the empirical part of our paper, we will present evidence on the extent to which 
Argentina and Brazil respectively have switched between the different regimes of debt 
dynamics over the period 1960-1999. The empirical equivalent of equation (5) that we 
use in our estimation is: 
 
) 1 ( 1 0 − + = d d α α &        ( 6 )  
 
with α0 = k(g ￿ sr/β), α1 = sr-g. Clearly, the regression coefficients are complex functions 
of behavioral parameters like the savings rate and exogenous but time-varying variables 
like the world interest rate. Without additional information on these parameters and 
variables, we can just report the regression estimates and account for potential time-
variation. If more information were available, an extended regression equation could be 
estimated. For instance, if adequate information on interest rate r could be used, one 
could (nonlinearly) regress d & on d(-1), r, and r*d(-1). We leave such exercises for future 
research. Note also that the explanatory variable in equation (6) is lagged one year. This 
is due to the switch from the continuous-time derivation of our theoretical model to the 





For our analysis, we need the stock of external debt for each country and GDP. While 
GDP is readily available both in current and constant prices, this is not the case for 
developing country’s stock of external debt. What is available is the time series of gross 
investments and savings for each country. These are flow variables and the difference 
between the two can be used as a proxy for the change in a country’s debt position (D). In 
order to arrive at an adequate measure of the level of D, we focus on the year 1992. The 
procedure is as follows, where we use Brazilian data for illustrative purposes. Clearly, the 
procedure for Argentina is the same.   9
First, we use the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
7 for 1992 to find investment 
income paid to the rest of the world (9102 million US$) and investment income from 
abroad (1100 Million US$). The difference (8002 million US$) corresponds to rD in our 
model. For an estimate of D, an appropriate value for the interest rate r is needed. To 
obtain an estimate of r, we compute the ratio of investment income paid abroad (9102 
million US$) in 1992 to the gross stock of external Brazilian debt in 1992 (about US$ 
128, 741 million US$) according to the Global Development Finance database. The 
resulting interest rate is about 7,07 %. Dividing net interest payments (rD = 8002 million 
US$) by 0.0707 yields a net foreign debt position of about 113 billion US$ as an initial 
value for 1992. Subsequently, we cumulatively add (subtract) the gross investment-
savings balance for later (previous) years. The resulting debt series is divided by nominal 
GDP (in US $) to arrive at our series d (and its first difference d & ). Appendix B contains 
the data.  
The time paths of Argentine and Brazilian debt/GDP ratios can be found in figure 
2. Both countries experienced declining debt ratios in the 1960 and early 1970s, reaching 
a floor of about 20 percent around 1975. Argentina roughly remains on that level – 
suggesting a sort of steady state as a permanent debtor – until 1990. Then a gradual rise 
sets in. In Brazil, debt moves steeply up again after 1975 to a peak in 1984 and a return to 
approximately the 1975 level around 1990. After 1996, an upward trend to a ratio of 35% 
is present again. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results  
 
We first estimate equation (6) for Brazil and Argentina over the whole sample period, 
1961-1999. Table 1 contains the results. The average debt dynamics for Argentina and 
Brazil appear to be qualitatively and quantitatively similar. For both countries the 
intercept is positive and (marginally) significant, while the slope is negative. Using 
standard critical values, the slope coefficients appear significant. However, one may 
notice that this dynamic specification can be interpreted as a simple Dickey-Fuller unit 
root test – or equivalently a stability test – of the debt ratio. It is well-known that standard 
                                                 
7 When sources are not explicitly mentioned the data are from the World Development Indicators, 1998 or 
Global Development Finance, 2000.   10
critical values is invalid in case the dependent variable in fact is nonstationary. The 
correct 10 percent MacKinnon critical value is 2.60, so that statistically speaking we 
cannot reject the slope to be zero. Equivalently, we cannot formally reject the debt ratio 
to be a random walk and behaving as an unstable process. Nevertheless, the results do at 
least suggest that on average both countries behaved over the period as if they were on 
the SD line. That is, the regressions predict that both countries over time converge to a 
steady state external debt to GDP ratio of around 25 percent. 
Part of the lack of strong statistical results may come from the short period we are 
investigating. It is well known that unit-root tests have low power in small samples. 
Unfortunately, there is little we can do to solve this problem as extending the sample 
backward is infeasible due to data limitations. Only time can solve the issue. Another 
explanation for the lack of statistical significance is that the debt dynamics of the two 
countries under consideration have switched back and forth between the three different 
regimes (SD, SC, and U). In that case, the average estimate will be biased towards zero 
and insignificance. 
In fact, we are interested exactly in the issue if and when countries switch 
between regimes and to what extent it contributes to predicting that we are moving into 
the direction of a crisis (from stable debtor to stable creditor to an unstable situation). 
Therefore, we would like to identify the sub periods over which different regimes were 
operative. But small sample problems then become even more overwhelming than in the 
full sample case. Before presenting at least some evidence of time-variation in the debt 
dynamics in Brazil and Argentina, we shortly discuss the routes we explored but not used 
in the end. 
First we re-estimated equation (6) with dummy variables (for both intercept and 
slope). We took economically plausible periods for the sub periods: 1961-1973 (period 
before the first oil crisis), 1974-1983 (period up till the Latin-American debt crisis), and 
1984-1996 (the period between the debt crisis and the Asian crisis). The period 1997-
1999 was used as – an admittedly short – benchmark period. As could be expected, 
results failed to gain significance due to the lack of degrees of freedom. Moreover, we 
could not be sure we had picked the right timing of regime switches. More sophisticated 
methods to endogenously determine the timing of structural breaks were inapplicable due   11
to the short time series.
8 Second, we tried Markov regime-switching and state space 
estimation with random walk coefficients. Neither approach yielded convergence or 
interpretable results, again due to the short length of our time series.  
Therefore, we turned to a rolling regression approach, where equation (6) is 
estimated for consecutive windows of seven years.
9 In figure 3 we present the time paths 
for estimated intercept and slope of the Argentine debt dynamics plus and minus one time 
the standard deviation of the regression coefficient. Due to the small samples, we don’t 
expect formal statistical significance. However, when the one standard deviation interval 
does not include zero – that is, the t-statistic is in excess of unity –, we take this as 
supportive evidence for a non-zero value of the coefficient. The figure shows that in most 
7-year intervals the intercept was positive, while the slope was negative. In these 
intervals, Argentine debt dynamics apparently can be characterized as consistent with the 
SD line in figure 1.  
Exceptions in the 1970s and 1980s are the sub periods 1967-1973, 1968-1974, 
and 1978-1984. In these intervals, the intercept becomes negative and the slope positive. 
This would be the case of the unstable path (U). The first two intervals cover the end of 
the Bretton Woods system and the subsequent oil crisis, the latter interval includes the 
contractionary US monetary policy after 1979 with rising interest rates, the global 
recession in 1980-1981, and the Latin-American debt crisis in 1982-1983. In our view, 
the fact that the Argentine debt dynamics switch to an unstable time path exactly in these 
specific periods provides suggestive support for our approach.
10 It is clear, though, that 
the regression coefficients switched to unstable parameter values only after the shock had 
occurred. Based on the 1975-1981 results, we would not have predicted the Latin-
American debt crisis in 1982-1983. So even if these estimations for the period 1978-84 
correctly register the switch to unsustainable debt dynamics after the facts, we do not find 
predictive power in the 1970s or 1980s. The same appears to be true in the 1990s. From 
the interval 1991-1997 onward, we document a slightly positive slope and an almost zero 
                                                 
8 See Bai and Perron (1998) and Perron and Vogelsang (1992) for such methods. 
9 Alternatively, we used 6 and 8 year windows. Since the results are qualitatively invariant to such 
variations in the size of the window, we only report results for the 7-year window regressions. 
10 Note, however, that in the periods 1967-73 and 1968-74 the data in the appendix show falling debt/GDP 
ratios with one or two exceptions and the economy therefore was on the good arm of the unstable debt 
dynamics.    12
intercept, suggesting unstable debt dynamics. Since 1992 all observations show 
increasing debt/GDP ratios, thus indicating that the economy is on the unsustainable arm 
of the unstable dynamics. However, again this appears to be observable only after the 
problems – in this case the Asian crisis and its spillover effects – had emerged. 
Closer inspection of the Argentine data shows that the above conclusion may be 
too negative. The regression estimates for the later part of the sample appear to be 
considerably influenced by the outlier observation of 1990 when a very large decrease in 
debt occurred. In figure 4, we present similar regression coefficients through time using 
7-year windows, excluding the year 1990. Starting with the 1985-1992 window, we now 
observe increasingly positive slopes and increasingly negative intercepts, pointing to 
deteriorating debt dynamics long before the Asian crisis. Moreover, the start of the much 
hailed currency board for the Argentine currency in 1991 has no mitigating effect at all 
on the worsening debt situation and may even have reinforced it because of a lack of due 
devaluations. After 1996, the coefficients improve somewhat, though they keep having 
the wrong sign. We conclude that our regressions do warn for Argentine debt problems 
long before they surfaced in practice when the outlier observation of 1990 is taken out. 
On the other hand, we observe strongly increasing uncertainty about the regression 
coefficients from 1982-1989 onwards as reflected in the large standard error in figure 4. 
Although the point estimates suggest problems, uncertainty about these point estimates 
was large and increasing. Moreover, in the period 1985-92 most of the observations show 
falling debt/GDP ratios. The upshot here is that once the dynamics has the unstable 
structure of regime U small shocks seem to be enough to move the economy from the 
good arm to the unsustainable one.   
Finally, we turn to the case of Brazil. We present 7-year rolling regressions 
coefficients in figure 5. Brazil – like Argentina – appears to have been characterized by 
stable debt dynamics over most of the intervals. Positive intercepts and negative slopes 
suggest Brazil is in a steady state debtor regime most of the time. Exceptions are the late 
seventies and early eighties (the windows 1974-1980 through 1977-1983), the late 
eighties (1984-1990) and late 1990s (1993-1999) where the slope moves towards zero. In 
the 1990s, problems in Brazil appear much later and weaker than in Argentina. Again, the 
intervals with unstable debt dynamics are easily identified as periods in which Brazil   13
suffered from real problems. However, we do not succeed in tracing patterns of 
instability prior to the occurrence of the problems themselves. On the other hand the 
trend towards positive slopes may continue and predict problems coming up after 1999.   
In general, the data and our empirical results suggest that switches to undesirable 
and unstable debt dynamics tend to be sudden and short-lived, making them hard to 
predict. These characteristics make it also difficult to find statistically convincing proof 
of our model. We do show, however, that the different qualitative regimes of the 
theoretical model can be observed in reality. Most of the time, this does not allow 
predicting coming crises. Argentina in the early 1990s appears an exception. When 
excluding the outlier year 1990, warning signals of coming problems were around 
already in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Debt dynamics actually deteriorated after the 




In this paper we develop a simple neoclassical growth model with perfect international 
capital mobility to analyze the international debt dynamics of developing countries in 
general and Brazil and Argentina in particular.  
We show that three different regimes can be distinguished: a stable regime where 
the country in the end always converges to a steady state debtor position, a stable regime 
where the country ends up in a steady state creditor position and an unstable regime 
which leads the country either to become a creditor without ever reaching a steady state 
or to get on an unsustainable path with an exploding debt ratio. Switches between these 
regimes can be caused only by shocks in the world interest rate or behavioral parameters 
like the country’s savings rate or rates of population growth and technical progress. 
A switch from a stable debtor to a stable creditor or even an unstable creditor 
regime is a sign of forthcoming trouble. If one would be able to identify such shift in 
advance, it would contribute to our ability to predict debt crises and to our understanding 
of such crises.  
To investigate this issue empirically, we construct debt ratio series for Brazil and 
Argentina over the period 1960-1999. Subsequently, we use these series to do the simple 
debt dynamics regression derived from the theoretical model. Over the full sample, the   14
evidence suggests that debt dynamics evolved according to the stable debtor case in both 
countries, although the results lack formal significance. Both the small sample and the 
possibility of short-lived intermediate switches between regimes over time prevent us 
from obtaining stronger statistical evidence. Using a rolling regression technique, we find 
that indeed occasional switches to the unstable regime occurred. The periods in which we 
find evidence of unstable regimes correspond with well-known problematic episodes in 
the countries under investigation. In that sense, our model appears a useful tool of the 
analysis of a country’s debt dynamics. In general, the rolling regression approach has 
little forecasting capacity, unfortunately. The exception may be Argentina in the early 
1990s where we find evidence of unstable debt dynamics before the start of the currency 
board. According to our results, Argentina was in the unstable regime for most of the 
1990s. In practice, Argentine problems only surfaced after 1997. For Brazil, our results 
show that debt dynamics deteriorated only after 1997, as they did in practice.  
A few caveats are in order. In the model, we ignore spreads on LIBOR 
(EURIBOR) and the prime rate. Moreover, the model does not take into account any 
features that are typical of developing countries such as imported capital goods, which 
would link the goods market equation to the balance of payments equation. Including 
these aspects makes a model much more complicated but has the potential for some 
improvement. We leave this for future research. 
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Appendix A: Solution of the differential equation 
 
The differential equation has the solution 
 
Dt D e K Be e
srt gt srt () () () ( ) =+ − 00       ( A 1 )  
 





[( ) ( )]
Dt
eK B K tB i f g s r o r









     ( A 2 )  
 
As sr/β >sr, we can distinguish four cases, which are interpreted as alternative levels of 
the savings ratio in Onitsuka (1974): 
 
1.  g > sr/β  > sr  implies 1 > B > 0  and  K(t) > D(t) > 0 
 
2. sr/β > g > sr  implies B < -1   and  K(t) > 0 > D(t) 
 
3. sr/β  > sr > g  implies B > 1    and  K(0) > D(0) > 0 > D(t) 
 
4. sr/β  > sr > g  implies B > 1    and  D(0) > > K(0) > 0 
 
In the first case, the country remains a debtor, but the capital stock is larger than the debt. 
In the second case the country becomes a creditor and foreign wealth D is larger than 
capital K. In the third case, assuming D(0)-K(0) < 0, D becomes negative and the country 
is again a creditor in the long run. In the fourth case, if D(0)-K(0) = - W(0) > 0 and 
sufficiently large, D remains negative, grows at the rate sr while capital K grows at rate 
g. This case if fairly unrealistic because it implies that the country has negative current 
wealth from the beginning and through eternal times while we see from the data that all 
countries have positive savings at almost all times. 
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Appendix B: Data 
 



















 US$  US$  *100 in %  *100 in %  US$  US$  *100 in %  *100 in 
% 
1960  NA NA NA NA  7763  15.166  51,2  NA 
1961  NA NA NA NA  7772  15.237  51,0  -0,2 
1962  16399 24.451  67,1  NA 8035 19.926  40,3  -10,7 
1963  15926 18.272  87,2  20,1 8052 23.021  35,0  -5,3 
1964  15263 25.605  59,6  -27,6 7902 21.212  37,3  2,3 
1965  13941 28.345  49,2  -10,4 7427 21.790  34,1  -3,2 
1966  12298 28.630  43,0  -6,2 8441 27.063  31,2  -2,9 
1967  11604 24.257  47,8  4,9 9474 30.592  31,0  -0,2 
1968  11710 26.437  44,3  -3,5  10490 33.876  31,0  0,0 
1969  11930 31.256  38,2  -6,1  11140 37.459  29,7  -1,2 
1970  12844 31.584  40,7  2,5  11917 42.328  28,2  -1,6 
1971  12703 33.293  38,2  -2,5  13286 49.204  27,0  -1,2 
1972  13112 34.733  37,8  -0,4  14678 58.539  25,1  -1,9 
1973  11934 52.544  22,7  -15,0  16551 79.279  20,9  -4,2 
1974  11247  72.437 15,5 -7,2  23533  105.136 22,4 1,5 
1975  10619  52.439 20,2  4,7  30090  123.709 24,3 1,9 
1976 8920 51.170  17,4  -2,8  36031  152.678  23,6  -0,7 
1977 8031 56.781  14,1  -3,3  40058  176.171  22,7  -0,9 
1978 6649 58.083  11,4  -2,7  47053  200.801  23,4  0,7 
1979 7095 69.252  10,2  -1,2  57714  224.969  25,7  2,2 
1980 8841 76.962  11,5  1,2  70590  235.025  30,0  4,4 
1981  11053  78.677 14,0  2,6  82305  263.561 31,2 1,2 
1982  13917  84.307 16,5  2,5  98643  281.682 35,0 3,8 
1983 16361 103.979  15,7  -0,8  105483 203.305  51,9  16,9 
1984  18213  79.092 23,0  7,3  105447  209.024 50,4 -1,4 
1985  18127  88.417 20,5 -2,5  105691  222.943 47,4 -3,0 
1986 21098 110.934  19,0  -1,5  110973 268.137  41,4  -6,0 
1987 25939 111.106  23,3  4,3  112425 294.084  38,2  -3,2 
1988 27240 126.207  21,6  -1,8  108393 329.913  32,9  -5,4 
1989  28684  76.637 37,4 15,8  107385  448.763 23,9 -8,9 
1990 25791 141.352  18,2  -19,2  113190 464.989  24,3  0,4 
1991 27831 189.720  14,7  -3,6  117702 407.729  28,9  4,5 
1992 34941 228.779  15,3  0,6  113182 390.567  29,0  0,1 
1993 43056 236.754  18,2  2,9  116081 438.299  26,5  -2,5 
1994 54105 257.711  21,0  2,8  120855 546.486  22,1  -4,4 
1995 59129 258.303  22,9  1,9  140562 704.168  20,0  -2,2 
1996 65687 272.436  24,1  1,2  166580 774.869  21,5  1,5 
1997 77736 293.167  26,5  2,4  201746 803.585  25,1  3,6 
1998 92101 298.444  30,9  4,3  240135 774.967  31,0  5,9 
1999  104255 283.166  36,8  6,0  267139 751.505  35,5  4,6 
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Table 1  A simple debt dynamics regression, 1960-1999 
 










2 0.121  0.115 
SE of regression  0.078  0.043 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.068  1.231 
   20



































III I   21
 

























































































































* The years in the graphs indicate the last years of the 7-year intervals. 
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